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Rhode Island’s Homeless Bill of 
Rights:  How Can the New Law 
Provide Shelter from Employment 
Discrimination? 
Michael F. Drywa, Jr.* 
On a single night in 2012 there were 633,782 homeless people 
in the United States, including 394,379 who were homeless as 
individuals and 239,403 people who were homeless in families.1 
 
In Rhode Island, a single night count from December 12, 2012, 
revealed that there were 996 Rhode Islanders homeless on that 
day.2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 27, 2012, Rhode Island Governor, Lincoln Chafee, 
signed into law the Homeless Bill of Rights (“HBOR”),3 the first 
law in the United States that provides for comprehensive legal 
protections to homeless persons. This landmark legislation 
 
* Senior Associate, Sims & Sims, LLP; Juris Doctor, Roger Williams 
University School of Law, 1998; B.S. Rhode Island College, 1988. 
 1.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., Office of Cmty. Planning & Dev., 
1 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT 3 (2012), available at 
https://www.onecpd.info/resources/documents/2012AHAR_PITestimates.pdf 
[hereinafter Homeless Report].  
 2.  Press Release, Rhode Island Coalition for the Homeless, New 
Homeless Numbers Show a System at a Dangerous Tipping Point (Dec. 19, 
2012), available at http://www.rihomeless.org/Portals/0/Uploads/Documents/ 
Winter%20shelter%20release12.pdf.  
 3.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-37.1-1 to -5 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
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provides protection against discrimination in connection with (1) 
freedom of movement in public; (2) access to municipal services; 
(3) employment; (4) emergency medical care; (5) voting; (6) 
confidentiality of personal records; and (7) privacy rights in 
personal property.4  This article specifically addresses how the 
HBOR applies in the employment context, and further explores 
how the statute fits within the State’s administrative and court 
systems and the challenges plaintiffs may experience in seeking to 
enforce the remedial provision of the law. 
Without question, homelessness as a protected category is 
something altogether new in the field of employment 
discrimination law; an area of law that continues to expand to less 
so-called “mainstream” categories, oftentimes with Rhode Island 
at the forefront of this expansion.5  Of course, Rhode Island is not 
alone in adding to an ever-expanding list of protected categories, 
as many other states (although not all) have also amended or 
enacted laws to provide protection to other categories.6  However, 
it can be said with certainty that Rhode Island is the first to add 
“homelessness” to this list.7 
In light of the fact that the HBOR is the first statute of its 
kind, there are no published legal decisions that address the 
question of a plaintiff’s discrimination in employment on the basis 
of homelessness, including the methods for asserting a claim, the 
mechanism of proof, and the statute of limitations.  However, it is 
worth noting that the homeless have been at the legal gristmill for 
 
 4.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 5.  For example, the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act was 
amended in 1995 to add “sexual orientation” as a protected category and in 
2001 to add “gender identity and expression.”  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41 
(West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41.1 (West 2006).  Additionally, in 
2002, the General Assembly passed a law to protect against employment 
discrimination on the basis of genetic testing; in 2004 on the basis of off-duty 
tobacco use; and in 2009 because of HIV/AIDS status and testing.  R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-1 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-20.10-14 (West 
2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-6.3-11(West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 6.  See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2014) (Genetic information, 
sexual orientation, gender expression, and gender identity); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 46a-60 (West 2013) (Gender identity or expression, and genetic 
information); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.075 (West 2002) (Sickle-cell); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4552 (2013) (Sexual orientation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 111, § 70F (West 2013) (No employer can require HIV tests as a condition 
of employment).   
 7.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
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many years, grinding away for legal protection on a number of 
fronts, many of which are grounded in general principles of 
Constitutional fairness.8  However, these cases address only the 
general civil rights of the homeless, not how that status plays into 
an employment discrimination claim, which is a legal animal of 
different stripes.9  Rhode Island’s HBOR fills that void for its 
citizens, but due to its novelty, there is no way to predict how a 
claim for employment discrimination based on homelessness will 
find its way through the system. 
Regardless of one’s view on the justification or need for the 
HBOR, homelessness can be fairly categorized as an 
unconventional category in the same vein as, for example, laws 
precluding discrimination on the basis of height or weight.10  That 
is not to say that these categories are any less worthy of 
protection; only that they have until now been relegated to 
marginal status.  Times are changing, however, and with them, 
the law.  For instance, Michigan, although presently providing no 
legal protection for its homeless population, does provide anti-
discrimination protection for height and weight in the Eliott-
Larsen Civil Rights Act, section 37.2102(1) of the Michigan 
Complied Laws, which states as follows: 
The opportunity to obtain employment, housing and other 
real estate, and the full and equal utilization of public 
accommodations, public service, and educational facilities 
without discrimination because of religion, race, color, 
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, familial status, 
or marital status as prohibited by this act, is recognized 
 
 8.  See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1583 (S.D. 
Fla. 1992) (finding that city’s continual arrest and harassment of homeless 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment and due process rights); Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 797 F. 
Supp. 2d 1005, 1016, 1019 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 
2012) (finding that homeless plaintiffs demonstrated likelihood of success on 
claims that City’s seizure and destruction of personal property as 
“abandoned” violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 9.  See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1583; Lavan, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1016, 
1019. 
 10.  See, e.g., Eliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
37.2102(1) (West 2001) (providing protection against height and weight 
discrimination), discussed infra. 
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and declared to be a civil right.11 
Interestingly, the Michigan statute provides no protection for 
sexual orientation or gender identity and expression.12 Hence, at 
least in that respect, Rhode Island can claim a more progressive 
position.13  In that same vein, it may just be a matter of time until 
the Rhode Island legislature enacts or amends statutes to include 
these other categories to comport with changing ideals of social 
fairness.14  In any event, the enactment of the HBOR does place 
into context the ever-expanding statutory protections of Rhode 
Island’s anti-discrimination laws. 
Section I of this Article briefly discusses the history of Rhode 
Island’s anti-discrimination laws leading up to the passage of the 
HBOR.  Section II analyzes how the HBOR fits within the State’s 
existing statutory scheme for employment discrimination claims.  
Section III reviews the procedural mechanisms that a person 
asserting a violation of the HBOR in the employment context 
should follow, the legal test to prove such a claim, and the 
applicable statute of limitations.  Section IV highlights some of the 
logistical and procedural challenges faced by plaintiffs asserting 
employment discrimination claims under the HBOR, and Section 
 
 11.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 12.  See id. 
 13.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-37.1-1 to -5. 
 14.  The courts, however, often do not wait for legislatures to act. For 
example, in 1993, the Supreme Court of California held that a person’s 
weight may qualify as a protected “handicap” within the meaning of the 
state’s Fair Employment Act if medical evidence showed that it is the result 
of “a physiological condition affecting one or more of the basic bodily systems 
and limits a major life activity.”  Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 
1143, 1144 (Cal. 1993).  “We do not intend, nor indeed are we at liberty, to 
define ‘physical handicap’ in terms we believe to be morally just or socially 
desirable.”  Id. at 1146.  Although the Cassista court did not create a new 
category of “weight” discrimination, it also was not that far off, either.  The 
Court found a way to provide protection to a class of persons who had no 
statutory protection previously. Similarly, in Cook v. Rhode Island., 
Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, the plaintiff had 
alleged that she was denied employment because the defendant perceived 
that she was disabled due to her morbid obesity. 10 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 
1993). There, the court determined that a jury could have found that the 
metabolic dysfunction and failed appetite-suppressing neural signals that led 
to the plaintiff’s obesity were beyond her control and rendered her effectively 
powerless to manage her weight.  Id. at 24.  In both these cases the courts 
may have been sending messages to the state legislatures. 
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V reviews how other states are following Rhode Island’s lead in 
addressing the need to provide statutory protection to their 
homeless population. 
I.   RHODE ISLAND’S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGACY 
The HBOR is nothing if not innovative.  It is, as already 
noted, the first statute in United States to offer legal protections 
to the homeless.15  However, Rhode Island’s place in this historical 
moment should come as no surprise to those familiar with the 
General Assembly’s long-established compassion for its 
marginalized population.16  Indeed, the Rhode Island General 
Assembly has shown a willingness to regularly amend Rhode 
Island’s anti-discrimination laws—or enact new laws—to reflect 
the changing views of Rhode Island’s populace and the progression 
of modern society.17  For example, Rhode Island passed its Fair 
Employment Practices Act (“FEPA”)18 in 1949, some fifteen years 
before the United States Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.19  Since that time, the General Assembly has amended the 
FEPA to include more progressive categories such as “sexual 
orientation” in 1995,20 and “gender identity and expression” in 
2001.21  More recently, the General Assembly passed laws 
protecting against employment discrimination based on genetic 
testing (2002),22 off-duty tobacco use (2004),23 and HIV/AIDS 
 
 15.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 16.  See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41 (West 2006) (sexual 
orientation); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41.1 (West 2006) (gender identity 
and expression); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-1 (West 2006) (genetic testing); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-20.10-14 (West 2006) (off-duty tobacco use); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-6.3-11 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010) (HIV/AIDS status and 
testing). 
 17.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41.1; 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-1; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-20.10-14; R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 23-6.3-11. 
 18.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-5-1 to -7 (West 2006). 
 19.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2–2000e-3 (2006). 
 20.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41. 
 21.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41.1.  It is worth noting that Congress 
has still not seen fit to amend Title VII to include protections for sexual 
orientation and gender identity or expression and it appears, as of this 
writing, that there nothing afoot at the federal level in that regard. 
 22.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-1 (Among other things, employers 
cannot require or administer a genetic test, affect the terms and conditions of 
employment of any employee who obtains a genetic test, or deny employment 
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status and testing (2009).24  These laws demonstrate the General 
Assembly’s continued response to the desires of Rhode Island’s 
population to see all of its citizens protected against 
discriminatory treatment.25 Homelessness is simply the next 
category taken up and there is no reason to believe that more 
categories will not be added in the future.  Indeed, the rationale 
for enacting the HBOR is set forth in the text of the statute and 
indicates as follows: 
(1) At the present time, many persons have been rendered 
homeless as a result of economic hardship, a severe 
shortage of safe, affordable housing, and a shrinking 
social safety net. 
(2) Article 1, Section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution 
states in part, that “All free governments are instituted 
for the protection, safety, and happiness of the people. All 
laws, therefore, should be made for the good of the whole; 
and the burdens of the state ought to be fairly distributed 
among its citizens. No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall 
any person be denied equal protection of the laws.” 
(3) Concordant with this fundamental belief, no person 
should suffer unnecessarily or be subject to unfair 
discrimination based on his or her homeless status. It is 
the intent of this chapter to ameliorate the adverse effects 
visited upon individuals and our communities when the 
state’s residents lack a home.26 
 
or take any other adverse action on an employee’s refusal to submit to a 
genetic test, provide a family health history, or reveal whether the employee 
has submitted to a genetic test and the test results). 
 23.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-20.10-14 (Employers cannot require an 
employee to refrain from smoking when off duty and cannot discriminate in 
the employee’s terms and conditions of employment for smoking while during 
off-duty hours). 
 24.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-6.3-11 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010) 
(Employers cannot discriminate against an employee because of a positive 
HIV test, or perception of a positive test, and cannot require an HIV test as a 
condition of employment). 
 25.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41.1; 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-1; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-20.10-14; R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 23-6.3-11. 
 26.  R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).  
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Hence, the General Assembly has declared unequivocally that 
the HBOR is grounded in traditional notions of Constitutional 
fairness and “equal protection.”27 This constitutional rationale 
could apply to essentially any and every characteristic, and could 
become the basis for any future anti-discrimination statute or 
amendment for categories that have not yet received legal 
protection in Rhode Island. 
Notably, although the HBOR’s rationale is clear, the statute 
makes no finding or declaration that homeless persons were the 
subjects of discriminatory treatment to begin with.28  That is not 
to say that the statute is merely aspirational; it is a statute with 
teeth, providing for the prosecution of a civil action for damages.29  
However, if homeless discrimination is (or was) a problem in 
Rhode Island as it relates to employment discrimination, this 
cannot be gleaned from the content of the statute, which states 
only that it intends “to ameliorate the adverse effects” of 
homelessness.30  By way of comparison, the FEPA, in addressing 
discrimination in employment, declares as follows: 
The denial of equal employment opportunities because of 
such discrimination and the consequent failure to utilize 
the productive capacities of individuals to fullest extent 
deprive large segments of the population of the state of 
earnings necessary to maintain decent standards of 
living, necessitates their resort to public relief, and 
intensifies group conflicts, thereby resulting in grave 
injury to the public safety, health, and welfare.31 
This may not be a fair comparison, where the HBOR deals with 
more than just employment discrimination while the FEPA 
exclusively addresses employment.32  That said, the question 
 
 27.  See id. The FEPA shares a similar rationale in that the statute 
declares that it is “the public policy of this state to foster the employment of 
all individuals in this state in accordance with their fullest capacities . . .” 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-2 (West 2006). 
 28.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-2. 
 29.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-4 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 30.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-2.  That is not to say that the author 
takes the position that there was no pressing need for the HBOR. To be sure, 
the General Assembly and Governor, as representatives of the citizens of the 
State, made the HBOR the law of the land.   
 31.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-2. 
 32.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); R.I. GEN. 
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turns to how a homeless person can pursue a claim of employment 
discrimination if he or she believes the HBOR has been violated. 
II.   PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
As noted previously, the HBOR addresses a homeless person’s 
right to employment: 
A person experiencing homelessness . . . [h]as the right 
not to face discrimination while seeking or maintaining 
employment due to his or her lack of permanent mailing 
address, or his or her mailing address being that of a 
shelter or social service provider.33 
Given its plain meaning, this section seems to codify the 
general principle that a homeless person enjoys the same 
protections as those afforded under the Rhode Island FEPA and 
the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”).34  However, the 
FEPA makes it unmistakably clear that “it shall be an unlawful 
employment practice” to (1) refuse to hire an applicant; (2) 
discharge an employee; or (3) discriminate against an employee in 
the terms and conditions of employment because of a person’s 
“race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or 
expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin.”35  The 
RICRA precludes discrimination more broadly as follows: 
All persons within the state, regardless of race, color, 
religion, sex, disability, age, or country of ancestral 
origin, have, except as otherwise provided or permitted by 
law, the same rights to make and enforce contracts, to 
inherit, purchase, to lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to 
 
LAWS ANN. § 28-5-5 (West 2006). 
 33.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3(3). 
 34.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-112-1 to -2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
Under the FEPA those protections include, among other things, freedom from 
discrimination in hiring, discharge, terms and conditions of employment, 
matters directly or indirectly related to employment, and (for disabled 
employees) a refusal to accommodate.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-7(1) (West 
2006). The RICRA, on the other hand, provides exceptionally broad 
protections that are virtually limitless, providing that no one in the 
enumerated categories could be denied the “equal benefit of all laws.” R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-112-1(a).      
 35.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-7(1). 
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the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of persons and property . . . 36 
The term “homelessness” is nowhere to be found in either the 
FEPA or the RICRA.37  Although the General Assembly did not 
expressly declare discrimination in employment based on 
homelessness to be “unlawful,” it is clear that was its intent in 
enacting the HBOR and in providing a remedy in the courts.38  
That intent, however, may be swallowed up by the verbiage. 
It is also worth noting that the FEPA makes clear that the 
right of persons to be free from discrimination is a civil right,39 
while the RICRA (which has the term “Civil Rights” in its title) 
clearly views protection against discrimination as a civil right.40  
When the HBOR speaks of rights, it employs the term “has the 
right to . . .” rather than affirmatively declaring such rights to be 
so-called civil rights.41  One may argue that this is merely a 
semantic distinction, but the words say what they say.  
Nonetheless, the legislative intent seems to contemplate that a 
homeless person’s right to be free from discrimination is indeed a 
civil right, insofar as the statute makes reference to the Rhode 
Island Constitution as a basis for the law.42  Ultimately, this has 
no legal effect and will likely never matter in an action for redress 
under the HBOR for discrimination.  However, there is a clear 
distinction between affirmatively declaring something a civil right 
and simply declaring that someone has a right to be free from 
something.  The question is more appropriately directed toward 
how the HBOR would address the case of a person who claims 
their employment rights were impaired due to their homeless 
status. 
 
 36.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-112-1(a).  
 37.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-5-1 to -7; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-112-1 
to -2. 
 38.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-4 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013) (“In 
any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the court may award 
appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief, actual damages, and reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff.”). 
 39.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-5 (West 2006). 
 40.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-112-1. Civil rights are defined as “[t]he 
individual rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights . . .” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009). 
 41.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013) (emphasis 
added).  
 42.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
MASTEREDITION19.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2014  7:33 PM 
2014] HOMELESS BILL OF RIGHTS 725 
III.   WHERE DOES A HOMELESS PLAINTIFF BEGIN? 
For a prospective plaintiff, there is no real guidance in the 
HBOR regarding the first step toward asserting an employment 
discrimination claim as a result of being homeless.  Should the 
prospective plaintiff look to the FEPA, the RICRA, or neither?  If a 
challenge should be made to the statute’s applicability in the 
context of whether it should be treated identically to other 
employment discrimination claims filed under the FEPA or 
RICRA, the Rhode Island Supreme Court would likely follow its 
canons of statutory interpretation and give deference to the 
legislature’s intent: 
It is well settled that the statutory language is the best 
indicator of the General Assembly’s intent. [The] Court 
will not construe a statute to achieve a meaningless or 
absurd result. Rather, when interpreting statutes, a court 
should construe each part or section in connection with 
every other part or section to produce a harmonious 
whole.43 
Logically, homelessness in the employment discrimination context 
should be treated the same as other categories in the FEPA or the 
RICRA.  After all, the HBOR makes it clear that a homeless 
person “[h]as the right not to face discrimination while seeking or 
maintaining employment[.]”44  However, the General Assembly’s 
choice not to amend the FEPA or RICRA to include homelessness 
as a distinct category may leave open a challenge as to whether a 
legal claim asserted under the HBOR is required to be pursued in 
the same manner as one brought, for example, for race 
discrimination under the FEPA; such a race discrimination claim 
would require that a plaintiff satisfy, at a minimum, certain 
administrative prerequisites in advance of filing a lawsuit.  The 
HBOR certainly provides for redress in the courts,45 but there is 
nothing in the HBOR that references an administrative filing. 
 
 43.  Zambarano v. Ret. Bd. Of Emp. Ret. Sys. of State, 61 A.3d 432, 436 
(R.I. 2013) (internal punctuation marks and citations omitted). 
 44.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3(3). 
 45.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-4 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
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A.   Is an Administrative Charge a Prerequisite for Suit Under the 
HBOR? 
As a first step, the FEPA requires that a claimant who alleges 
an employer (or prospective employer) has taken an adverse 
employment action or has refused to hire based on a protected 
characteristic file an administrative charge at the Rhode Island 
Commission for Human Rights (the “Commission”) before suit can 
be initiated.46  Does this exhaustion of administrative remedies 
requirement apply to the HBOR as well?  As always, reference to 
the statutory language is the sensible starting point.  
Unfortunately, a review of the HBOR’s text fails to yield any 
affirmative guidance.  Prudence may dictate that, since the HBOR 
falls under the same title (“Property”) as the Fair Housing 
Practices Act (“FHPA”),47 the administrative filing requirements 
contained in the FHPA would mandate that any charge under the 
HBOR be filed with the Commission in advance of seeking a right 
to sue.  A similar position could be taken with regard to the 
FEPA’s administrative prerequisites, at least as the HBOR relates 
to employment discrimination. Nonetheless, and despite this 
rational view, the statute is silent on the necessity of seeking 
redress at the Commission in advance of taking to the courthouse.  
This dearth of clarity may ultimately lead to a challenge regarding 
whether such a requirement is statutorily mandated.48 
On this point, the seminal case of Ward v. City of Pawtucket is 
instructive.49  In Ward, the plaintiff, a police officer, sued the City 
of Pawtucket and a number of officials, alleging sexual 
discrimination after she learned that a male officer with lesser 
qualifications and a lower ranking on the promotion list was 
slated to receive a promotion to lieutenant ahead of her.50  Almost 
immediately upon learning this, the plaintiff filed an intake 
questionnaire with the Commission (the first step in the 
administrative process) and was informed that, due to the backlog 
in cases, it would take four to five months before the Commission 
 
 46.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-5-17 to -18 (West 2006). 
 47.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37-1 to -11 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).   
 48.  The solution is simple: amend both the FEPA and the FHPA to 
include “homelessness” in the list of characteristics for which protection is 
provided. 
 49.  639 A.2d 1379 (R.I. 1994).  
 50.  Id. at 1380. 
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could draft a complaint; by then, the promotion list would have 
expired and the plaintiff would be required to retest and re-qualify 
for a new list.51  Within days, the plaintiff brought suit under the 
RICRA and obtained a temporary restraining order against the 
police department, preventing the City from promoting anyone to 
lieutenant.52  The police department moved to dismiss the suit, 
claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff 
had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.53  The court 
granted dismissal and dissolved the temporary restraining 
order.54  Thereafter, the department promoted a male to the 
position of lieutenant and, when the promotion list subsequently 
expired, the plaintiff re-tested and was ranked first on the new 
list.55  The Rhode Island Supreme Court took up the question of 
whether the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s 
complaint on the grounds that she had failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies under the RICRA.56  The Court declared 
that despite providing “broad protection against all forms of 
discrimination in all phases of employment,” the RICRA contained 
no language expressly requiring exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, as the FEPA does.57 
In the case of the HBOR, there is certainly no language 
requiring a prospective plaintiff to first file a charge at the 
Commission.58  Yet the statute does reference the right to court 
action: “In any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the 
court may award appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief, 
actual damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to a 
prevailing plaintiff.”59  It could fairly be argued that a homeless 
person’s first venue of redress in an employment discrimination 
context is the courts, not the Commission.  Applying the Ward 
rationale, such a position appears eminently reasonable.  To be 
sure, the Ward Court noted that there was no ambiguity in the 
RICRA’s language such that an administrative filing requirement 
 
 51.  Id. at 1380–81. 
 52.  Id. at 1381. 
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 1381–82. 
 58.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37-1 to -11 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).   
 59.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-4. 
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was a prerequisite to suit: “There is no language requiring, or 
even suggesting, that a plaintiff must first exhaust any or all 
administrative remedies before filing a civil action.”60 
By way of comparison, the Rhode Island Civil Rights of People 
With Disabilities Act61 specifically references a filing with the 
Commission: 
No persons with a disability whose action for 
discrimination is otherwise within the jurisdiction of the 
commission for human rights under chapter 5 of title 28, 
chapter 24 of title 11 or chapter 37 of title 34 may bring 
an action under this section, unless the commission for 
human rights has failed to act upon that person’s 
complaint within sixty (60) days of filing, or the 
commission has issued a final order on the complaint.62 
Although the Disabilities Act stands apart from the FEPA, 
the FEPA nonetheless designates “disability” as a distinct 
protected category.63  Hence, the fact that the HBOR retains its 
own identity would not preclude adding “homelessness” to the list 
of protected categories in the FEPA, which would then trigger the 
prerequisite of filing a claim with the Commission. 
From a practical (and perhaps social or policy-oriented) 
perspective, immediate access to the courts for a homeless 
plaintiff in an employment discrimination case may make sense.  
Indeed, if a person were terminated from employment because of 
her homeless status, it would seem her prospects for extricating 
herself from her homeless plight would be more expeditiously 
aided by a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction 
preserving the status quo (i.e., employment) issued by a court, 
rather than awaiting the results of a Commission hearing.  As the 
Ward Court noted, a Commission hearing’s results could take 
months or years to issue and would result in an order directing 
the offending employer to “cease and desist” its unlawful 
discrimination, even if the results were in the plaintiff’s favor.64  
 
 60.  Ward, 639 A.2d at 1382. 
 61.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-87-1 to -5 (West 2006). 
 62.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-87-4(b) (emphasis added).  
 63.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-6(4) (West 2006). 
 64.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-24(a)(1) (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 34-37-5(h)(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
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By that time, any remedy may be worthless.  Hence, it appears 
that it was the General Assembly’s intent to allow a HBOR 
plaintiff immediate access to the courts. 
Significantly, the HBOR, like the RICRA, provides that a 
plaintiff may seek injunctive relief.65  In Ward, the court spoke of 
the remedy of injunctive relief available in the RICRA when 
addressing whether an administrative filing is needed: 
To interpret § 42-112-1(c) as requiring exhaustion of all 
administrative remedies before filing a civil action would 
render § 42-112-2 a nullity.  This provision created a civil 
cause of action in a person whose rights under § 42-112-1 
have been violated.  It specifically states that an 
aggrieved party may seek injunctive, among other, relief. 
The purpose of this injunction is to prevent imminent, 
irreparable injury.  An injunction is an extraordinary 
remedy available only when there is no adequate remedy 
at law.  Because of the imminent nature of the threatened 
harm, time is of the essence in any proceeding for 
injunctive relief.  The plaintiff’s is clearly the type of 
situation that the Legislature contemplated when it 
enacted § 42-112-2.  The Rhode Island Commission for 
Human Rights indicated that it would take four to five 
months to draft a discrimination complaint on behalf of 
the plaintiff.  By that time, the original promotion list 
would have expired.  Years could pass before an 
investigation was completed, during which time plaintiff 
would be denied her civil rights.66 
The same can be said for a plaintiff claiming discrimination 
on the basis of homelessness under the HBOR, especially where 
the loss or denial of employment could exacerbate the condition. 
Similarly, from a failure-to-hire perspective, a homeless 
person who is denied employment because of their homeless 
status—employment that would likely have allowed them to 
obtain a permanent residence—does not have the luxury of simply 
 
 65.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-4 (“[a] court may award injunctive 
and declaratory relief”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-112-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2013) (plaintiff “may commence a civil action for injunctive and other 
appropriate equitable relief”). 
 66.  Ward, 639 A.2d at 1382 (citations omitted). 
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waiting months or years for the Commission to resolve their 
complaint.  In the interim, due to the very nature of being 
homeless, the plaintiff may be difficult or impossible to locate 
during the pendency of the administrative proceeding, resulting in 
possible default or other negative consequences.  In such a case, 
an administrative filing requirement works to undermine the 
purpose of the HBOR. 
For the homeless who suffer termination of employment, their 
lost income makes the prospect of finding permanent housing 
more difficult.  Moreover, once no longer employed, it will likely be 
difficult to locate a claimant (who has no permanent address) 
during the lifeline of a slow-moving administrative proceeding.  In 
short, by the time the Commission may be able to do any good for 
a homeless person who suffered an adverse employment decision, 
the employee may have been out of work for months and may have 
moved numerous times during that period, perhaps even out of 
state, exacerbating the homelessness problem rather than 
improving it.  Therefore, common sense dictates that a plaintiff 
asserting a claim for employment discrimination under the HBOR 
should have immediate access to the courts.  The statute certainly 
does not expressly preclude a lawsuit for failure to bring a claim 
at the Commission. 
Ultimately, it remains unclear whether the HBOR requires 
that a person aggrieved under its provisions in the employment 
context needs to take their case before the Commission first, at 
the peril of losing their right to access the courts.  Practitioners 
should unquestionably err on the side of caution until clarity is 
brought to the statute by either the courts or the legislature.  If 
the General Assembly means to mandate an administrative filing 
under the HBOR, it should consider amending the statute in 
accordance with the aforementioned policy concerns. 
B.   Proof of Homeless Discrimination 
Notwithstanding the question of the administrative filing 
requirement, once a homeless discrimination in employment case 
is in court, one may expect that the legal test employed by state 
and federal courts since McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,67 
would be used to determine whether, in fact, employment 
 
 67.  411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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discrimination on the basis of homelessness had occurred: 
“Fundamentally, the plaintiff must prove that he or she is a 
member of a class entitled to the protection of [the anti-
discrimination law] and that he or she has been treated differently 
from other similarly situated employees who are not members of 
the class.”68  Although the elements needed to demonstrate 
employment discrimination vary with the circumstances,69 proof 
of discrimination is shown via circumstantial evidence using the 
well-known burden-shifting paradigm set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas.70  Applying that methodology to the HBOR, a plaintiff 
would be required to show (1) she was homeless; (2) she was 
qualified for the applied-for job or was performing her job at an 
acceptable level; (3) she was refused the job or suffered some form 
of adverse employment action; and (4) the position applied for was 
given to an equally- or lesser-qualified non-homeless person or 
non-homeless employees were otherwise treated more favorably.71 
Against this framework, the first hurdle would be to show 
that the plaintiff is homeless within the meaning of the statute.  
For this, the HBOR borrows the definition contained in the FHPA:  
“For purposes of this chapter, ‘housing status’ shall have the same 
meaning as that contained in §34-37-3.”72  That definition reads:  
“The term ‘housing status’ means the status of having or not 
having a fixed or regular residence, including the status of living 
on the streets or in a homeless shelter or similar temporary 
residence.”73  Showing that a plaintiff is homeless should not be 
 
 68.  Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm’n for Human Rights, 
484 A.2d 893, 898 (R.I. 1984). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See id.  See also Neri v. Ross Simons, Inc., 897 A.2d 42, 49 (R.I. 
2006); Casey v. Town of Portsmouth, 861 A.2d 1032, 1037 (R.I. 2004).  
Unquestionably, the most difficult component of any employment-related 
discrimination claim is one brought under a “failure to hire” theory.  Unlike 
an employee who has worked for an employee for any measure of time and 
has, consequently, gotten to know the makeup of the workforce first hand, a 
prospective employee possesses no such “inside” information.  
 72.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37.1-5 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 73.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-3(16) (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).  
Interestingly, the HBOR itself references homeless status, R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 
34-37.1-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013), as opposed to the FHPA’s use of the 
term “housing status,” which also includes persons with fixed or regular 
residences.  
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difficult. To be sure, generally speaking, the plaintiff’s burden of 
proving the entire prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglass 
test is not “especially onerous” and creates a rebuttable 
presumption that discrimination occurred.74  Once the prima facie 
case is established, the burden would then shift to the employer to 
rebut the inference of discrimination by offering a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.75  The employer’s burden 
at this stage is one of production only, and, once the employer 
provides a nondiscriminatory reason (e.g., education, experience), 
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s 
reasons for taking the adverse action were false or a “pretext” for 
covering up discrimination.76 
The single biggest challenge for a plaintiff who asserts 
employment discrimination based on homelessness will likely be 
demonstrating that the “bad actor” was aware of the employee or 
prospective employee’s status as “homeless” and used that status 
as a basis for discrimination.  If a homeless person is denied 
employment in favor of a similarly (or lesser) qualified person, the 
plaintiff would likely need to show that the employer actually 
queried about the plaintiff’s address (or lack thereof if an 
application is submitted) and was directly informed that the 
plaintiff was homeless, resided in a shelter, or otherwise had no 
permanent address.  Practically speaking, if an employer does not 
know that the applicant is homeless, it cannot discriminate on 
that basis. This logic is seen in disability discrimination cases 
where plaintiffs claim their employers discriminated against them 
without any showing that the employer knew of the disability. 
A person alleging a disability protected by the ADA has 
the burden of establishing with medical evidence the 
existence of the alleged disability, and presenting the 
documentation during the term of employment, not 
following termination. To hold otherwise would render 
the requirement of a physical impairment superfluous 
and meaningless and would allow anyone with any kind 
of condition, regardless of the severity, to claim a physical 
 
 74.  Ctr. for Behavioral Health, R.I., Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 685 
(R.I. 1998). 
 75.  Neri, 897 A.2d at 49. 
 76.  Id. at 50. 
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impairment. An employer cannot accommodate a 
disability of which it is unaware; moreover, employers 
should not be expected to recognize a physical 
impairment solely and employee’s ‘say-so.’77 
Similarly, if a plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action 
while working for an employer, the challenge is no less difficult.  If 
the plaintiff was hired while homeless, and the employer was 
aware of this, it would certainly be a monumental task to show 
that her termination, demotion, or bad performance review was 
somehow tied to her homeless status—surely not an impossible 
task, but made all the more difficult by the fact that the employer 
hired her knowing that she was homeless. A different challenge 
exists in a case where an employee becomes homeless while 
employed. Again, a plaintiff would need to show the employer was 
made aware of this fact and, ultimately, that it factored into the 
adverse employment decision.  In contrast, a plaintiff who suffers 
an adverse employment action on the heels of such a disclosure 
would presumptively have a stronger case. 
Another point to consider, in keeping with the HBOR’s 
comparison to disability discrimination law, is whether an 
employer is required to provide an accommodation to a homeless 
employee for circumstances that may be unique to the homeless 
employee.  For instance, if a family lives in a car78 and the 
employee needs to come in late to work because her child will be 
unsupervised in the car until he goes to school, does the employer 
face liability under the HBOR for disciplining the employee for 
chronic tardiness or refusing to allow a modified schedule?  The 
HBOR is silent on this issue, yet it could be fairly argued that 
adverse employment actions resulting from the need to address a 
 
 77.  Kalekirstos v. CTF Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 641, 657 (D.D.C. 
1997) (internal punctuation and citations omitted); see also James v. Hyatt 
Regency Chicago, 707 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A] plaintiff must show 
that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was 
aware of his disability; and (3) the employer filed to reasonably accommodate 
the disability.”) (quoting Kotwica v. Rose Packing Co., 637 F.3d 744, 747–48 
(7th Cir. 2011)). Obviously, “knowledge” of a protected characteristic is less of 
a challenge to prove when the claim is based on gender or race, for example, 
where such characteristics are self-evident without the need for query. 
 78.  Approximately one-third of homeless persons were in “unsheltered” 
locations at the time the data was collected.  Homeless Report, supra note 1, 
at 3.  
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condition that directly results from homelessness may qualify for 
protection under the HBOR. 
In summary, a person asserting a claim of homeless 
discrimination in employment under the HBOR is likely to be 
bound to the same legal rules that apply to all other types of 
employment discrimination, including the legal test needed to 
prove discrimination in the courts. These rules are tried and true, 
but questions remain on how the courts will treat these claims. 
C.   Which Statute of Limitations Should Apply? 
Whether consciously or not, the General Assembly omitted 
any reference to another practical question: which statute of 
limitations would apply to an employment discrimination claim 
grounded in homelessness?  If the limitations period set forth in 
the FEPA and FHPA is used, the time for initiating a charge of 
discrimination at the RICHR would be one year.79  This would 
certainly make sense because the HBOR is codified under Title 34 
of the Rhode Island General Laws entitled Property, which 
includes the FHPA, a statute that the HBOR references for 
defining “housing status.”80 
However, the FHPA explicitly states, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
[W]henever an aggrieved individual . . . makes a charge . . 
. to the commission that any person . . . has violated . . . 
any provision of this chapter, and that the alleged 
discriminatory housing practice has occurred or 
terminated within one year of the date of filing, the 
commission may initiate an preliminary investigation 
and if it shall determine after the investigation that it is 
probable that unlawful housing practices have been or are 
being engaged in, it shall endeavor to eliminate the 
unlawful housing practices . . .81 
The FHPA speaks clearly; the one-year limitation specified in 
the statute applies only to unlawful housing practices, not 
employment discrimination.  Hence, any claim that the FHPA 
limitations period applies would likely be untenable. 
 
 79.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-17(a) (West 2006). 
 80.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 81.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-5(b) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
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The FEPA parallels this language virtually verbatim as it 
relates to unlawful employment practices, including reference to 
the one-year limitations period.  There should be very little debate 
regarding which limitation applies when one is claiming 
discrimination based on the categories listed.82  However, since 
homelessness is not identified in the FEPA as a protected 
category, the HBOR is left without a defined limitations period.  
As already noted, the HBOR is unquestionably grounded in 
constitutional principles, and expressly predicated on the equal 
protection clause of the Rhode Island Constitution, Article 1, 
Section 2.83  As discussed in detail above, this makes the HBOR 
more closely akin to the RICRA, which provides for a three-year 
statute of limitations.84  Of course, the RICRA did not always 
contain a three-year limitation.  Indeed, the Act provided no 
limitations period until the General Assembly amended the 
statute after the Rhode Island Supreme Court decision in Horn v. 
Southern Union Co.85 
In Horn, the United States District Court for the District of 
Rhode Island had certified to the Court the question of whether, in 
an employment discrimination case asserted under the RICRA, 
the one-year FEPA period applied or the general three-year 
limitations period under section 9-1-14(b) for “injuries to the 
person.”86  In answering the question, the Court determined that 
[s]ince the FEPA and the RICRA are in pari materia with 
respect to employment discrimination claims, we must 
make every effort to harmonize the two statutes when 
determining what statute of limitations applies to 
employment discrimination claims raised pursuant to the 
RICRA.  It is our opinion that harmonization of these two 
statutes can best be achieved by engrafting onto the 
RICRA the one-year statute of limitations contained in 
the FEPA.87 
 
 82.  Such as race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity 
or expression, disability, age, county of ancestral origin. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
28-5-1 (West 2006). 
 83.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37.1-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 84.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-112-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 85.  927 A.2d 292 (R.I. 2007). 
 86.  See id. at 292–94. 
 87.  Id. at 295. 
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Evidently, the General Assembly disagreed with the Court 
and amended the RICRA in 2010 to add a three-year limitations 
period.88  In light of this, it would seem that the HBOR would 
enjoy the same statute of limitations as the RICRA.  However, 
with the Legislature failing to expressly indicate this, a court 
challenge on this point may be on the horizon. 
IV.   CHALLENGES FACED BY HBOR PLAINTIFFS 
As should be evident from the preceding discussion, there are 
many challenges that a plaintiff will have in asserting a claim for 
employment discrimination under the HBOR beyond the 
uncertainty of where to file first and the time limits of asserting a 
claim.  Logistically, the fact that a plaintiff is homeless creates 
difficulties in communication between and among the Commission 
(assuming an administrative filing is required), the court, and his 
or her attorney and opposing counsel.  Regardless of how long a 
case may languish in the Commission or court, the ability for an 
employer (whether directly or through counsel) to communicate 
with an aggrieved employee regarding, say, a settlement or 
hire/reinstatement offer may be stymied by the inability to reach 
the employee. With no fixed or steady mailing address, 
communication may occur only when an employee is able to 
appear in person to determine the status of the case, which itself 
may be fortuitous.  Similar challenges arise if the employee’s 
attendance is necessary at Commission hearings, depositions, or 
court appearances.  In the context of a court action, default looms 
if the employee cannot participate in the prosecution of a lawsuit 
by missing appearance dates or not responding to discovery in a 
timely fashion. 
Another challenge is the ability to retain an attorney to 
pursue a claim on behalf of a homeless plaintiff.  Since it is 
unlikely that a plaintiff in these circumstances has the financial 
means to pay for legal services by the hour (they have lost their 
job or been denied employment), an attorney would be expected to 
work on a contingency basis, taking a share of the ultimate award 
or settlement.  Although the HBOR provides that a prevailing 
plaintiff may be awarded attorney’s fees and costs, attorneys may 
balk at taking such cases on a contingency basis since there is no 
 
 88.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 41-112-2. 
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guarantee that, if successful, they will realize a fair wage for the 
time expended.  Moreover, a homeless plaintiff may be far more 
willing (even anxious) to settle “short” and take the first 
settlement offer made by the employer in order to get something 
immediately.  Even if the attorney counsels against a rash 
resolution, the employee-client is the gatekeeper of the case and, if 
he or she determines a small settlement amount (relative to the 
attorney’s valuation of the case) to be fair, the attorney may be left 
with fees that amount to pennies on the dollar for the time 
expended.  Such impetuous settlement seems even more likely if 
the plaintiff is appearing pro se, with no guidance from a legal 
professional. 
Hence, there are numerous procedural and logistical 
challenges that face someone who seeks to use the HBOR for 
redress in employment discrimination.  Despite these challenges, 
at some point a plaintiff asserting such a claim will need to wend 
his or her way through the administrative and/or court system 
(either alone or with an attorney) to figure out how the HBOR is 
supposed to work. 
V.   OTHER STATES 
Rhode Island, despite being the first, is not the only state to 
provide legal protection to its homeless citizens.  As of the date of 
publication, there are two other states who have taken this step.  
On August 22, 2013, the Illinois governor signed into law its 
version of a homeless “bill of rights.”89  The text of the Illinois 
statute mirrors many of the key elements of the Rhode Island 
HBOR (often verbatim). However, in the context of employment 
protections, the wording of the Illinois law indicates that a 
homeless person has “the right not to face discrimination while 
maintaining employment due to his or her lack of permanent 
mailing address, or his or her mailing address being that of a 
shelter or social service provider.”90  This differs from the Rhode 
Island HBOR, which also provides the right to be free from 
 
 89.  Homeless ‘Bill of Rights’ Becomes Law in Illinois, EQUAL VOICE (Aug. 
26, 2013.) http://www.equalvoiceforfamilies.org/homeless-bill-of-rights- 
becomes-law-in-illinois/. 
 90.  775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45 / 10(a)(3) (West 2013). 
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discrimination in seeking employment.91  Apart from that single 
omission, the wording of that clause is identical.  This would seem 
to mean that a homeless person suffering discrimination in the 
hiring process in Illinois has no recourse under the Illinois 
Homeless Bill of Rights in a “failure-to-hire” context, a peculiar 
omission in light of the stated purpose of the statute. 
In Connecticut, the governor signed that state’s Homeless Bill 
of Rights into law on July 11, 2013, with an effective date of 
October 1, 2013.92  That law, although again borrowing some of its 
text from the Rhode Island HBOR, provides more comprehensive 
protections for homeless persons in the employment context, with 
a clause indicating that a homeless person has the right to “[h]ave 
equal opportunities in employment.”93  This would seem to be 
even more broad-sweeping than the Rhode Island’s HBOR insofar 
as it does not limit redress in employment to simply “seeking” or 
“maintaining” employment.  Ultimately, it is likely that, in the 
coming years, other states will attempt or enact laws protecting 
their homeless citizens from discrimination in all aspects of their 
lives, including employment.  However, there is no grand debate 
underfoot for “homeless” legislation in any manner that could 
rival the exposure and passion of recent civil rights movements 
involving, for instance, gay marriage. Ultimately, the choice will 
reside with the state, as it is all too evident that the federal anti-
discrimination statutes still lag behind most states in expanding 
protections. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Rhode Island’s HBOR, although unquestionably altruistic in 
its reach, does suffer from a measure of ambiguity on key points 
as they relate to the employment context, such as questions 
concerning administrative filings, accommodations, and the 
statute of limitation.  These are no small problems as the lack of 
guidance in the statute may lead to a number of delays that could 
prejudice a prospective plaintiff’s rights, such as an unnecessary 
filing at the Commission or a dismissal in a civil court for failure 
 
 91.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 92.  Scott Keyes, Connecticut Passes Landmark ‘Homeless Person’s Bill of 
Rights’ Law, THINK PROGRESS (June 12, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://thinkprogress 
.org/justice/2013/06/12/2139181/connecticut-homeless/. 
 93.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-500(b)(2) (West 2013). 
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to exhaust administrative remedies.  Now would be the time to 
clarify these points before homeless plaintiffs (and their attorneys) 
try to test the system for the appropriate first step. 
From a political perspective, having a stand-alone statute 
entitled “Homeless Bill of Rights” gets a lot of mileage.  Of that 
there is little doubt.  However, if the tank runs dry when it comes 
to practical application, was the lack of efficacy worth the political 
gain? 
 
 
